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2.1  Introduction 
American monetary policy in the 1980s contained two experiments separat- 
ing periods of  normality. Debates continue about the exact purpose, nature, 
and duration of these episodes. The first one, which began in late 1979, in- 
volved at least a technical change in the procedure used by the Federal Re- 
serve (the body charged with managing the nation’s money) to control money 
growth.  Its broader consequences included periods of double-digit interest 
rates and a recession of extraordinary severity. The second, smaller, experi- 
ment lasted for a year or so from mid-1985 and involved international mone- 
tary summits and accords that orchestrated an  orderly reduction in the real 
exchange value of  the dollar of  about a third in a little over a year. Neither 
experiment really continues. The 1979 procedures were discontinued some- 
time in late 1982. While intermittent summits continue, they have not created 
a situation in which the monetary policies of the United States and other coun- 
tries are routinely coordinated. 
Just how novel were these episodes? Did they mark lasting departures in 
the way  monetary policy is made? Can existing theories of presidential and 
congressional influence and partisan politics in monetary policy accommodate 
them, or do we need new theory? And of  course-though  it is a little like 
asking Mrs. Lincoln how she felt about the play-how  well do the existing 
theories explain the rest of monetary policy in the 1980s? 
It is trite but always worth repeating that monetary policy is made  in  a 
political context. Its politics should be as subject to systematic explanation as 
any other. Models of  monetary policy-making range from the economists’ 
rational maximizer of  social welfare to the organizational process theorist’s 
James E. Alt is professor of government at Harvard University. 
41 42  JamesE. Alt 
muddler who stumbles incrementally from crisis to crisis. In between lies the 
view taken in this paper of the monetary authority as an agent, who maximizes 
his own welfare in the institutional context of incentives set by  another (the 
principal) so that the agent’s maximizing serves the principal’s purposes. 
This agency perspective has two immediate consequences. First, there is 
little purpose in asking whether the agent’s behavior serves his or the princi- 
pal’s purposes. It should serve both. Instead, we seek to understand how the 
structure of  the institutions affects the agent’s performance and, at the same 
time, given the principal’s desires, why such institutions should have evolved. 
Second, the Federal Reserve is an agent-in  spite of its “independent” sta- 
tus-with  several principals (Goodfriend 1988). Focusing on the multiplicity 
of principals and the agent’s motives (particularly, the chairman’s desire to be 
reappointed) integrates findings that otherwise seem contradictory. So while 
we  do not understand the politics-or  the economics-of  monetary policy 
perfectly, the argument goes, there does not, on the whole, seem to be much 
need to jettison all our existing theory. 
2.1.1  %o  Questions, Three Theories 
However, “the existing theory” is not a tight, unified corpus of  empirically 
testable, deductively linked propositions. Even leaving aside technical ques- 
tions, it includes the economic theory of regulatory capture, the political- 
economic theory of regulatory design, political business-cycle theory, what 
has come to be called partisan theory, the theory of  bureaucracy, and the eco- 
nomics of international coordination. Throughout this rich mklange of ideas, 
however, most who write on the political economy of  monetary policy want 
to answer one of two basic questions. First, what does the Fed do and why? 
And, given the answer to the first, should we change the design of our insti- 
tutions for making monetary policy, and how? 
The answers that exist come largely from three directions. One is called 
“partisan theory.” Applied to monetary policy it predicts finding politically 
created effects coming ufer elections, as presidential influence is used  to 
bring about policies beneficial to the supporters of the president’s party. Evi- 
dence supports the expectation that partisan presidential influence should be 
reflected in regular swings in policy, that Democrats favor easier, and Repub- 
licans tighter, policies. Second, the theory of  the “political business cycle” 
predicts easing of  monetary policy before  elections, attributed to (usually 
presidential) political influence motivated by the demands of reelection poli- 
tics. There is supporting evidence, but it also appears (as much in the an- 
nounced targets as in the actual policy outcomes) that the Fed generally avoids 
visible policy changes (that is, ducks out of the storm) during election years. 
In fact, our model of the president-Fed relationship unifies these first two 
approaches. Considering the Fed chairman’s desire for reappointment along 
with the president’s desire for reelection provides predictions of different sorts 
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money supply occur depends on whether an incumbent is running, how prob- 
able his reelection is, and how  long the chairman and  the president have 
served, among other things. 
Third, “congressional influence” is also claimed to exist in monetary pol- 
icy.  While  presidential  influence is  rooted  in  the  power  of  appointment, 
congressional influence arises from the ability to amend the Federal Reserve 
Act.  However,  there  is  more  congressional  involvement  in  financial- 
regulatory policy then monetary policy, probably because the distributive as- 
pects of monetary policy do not generally translate neatly into the geography 
of congressional districts. 
2.1.2  One Theme: Agency Relationships 
While the Federal Reserve is nominally an independent agency within the 
government, it is not autonomous. It lacks the ability to set rules of commu- 
nication and establish the structure of incentives to which others must react- 
in  short, to design the game. Rather, it should be  expected at most to act 
optimally within a set of incentives created by others, its principals. It is an 
agent with several principals: the president, Congress, and  the interest groups 
that make up the financial community. 
Introducing principal-agent models has two main consequences. First, in 
general, in multiple-principal problems the inability of principals to coordi- 
nate strategies may dominate their ability, given a joint strategy, to coordinate 
agents’ behavior optimally (Myerson 1982). Without simple, unique equilib- 
ria in such models, the posited standards that economists like to use to specify 
optimal economic policy in  normative models cannot be rooted in  rational 
collective action. However, absence of  unique equilibria need not  prevent 
stable interactions if  principals bargain over policy and choose an agent who 
has strong preferences for the bargaining outcome. Then, however, in the po- 
litical context of monetary policy, things that affect the bargaining outcome- 
say, divided partisan control of government or ideological conflict within ad- 
ministrations-will  affect the agent’s behavior as well. 
Second, thinking of monetary policy this way focuses attention on the in- 
teresting feature of principal-agent problems, the agent’s private information. 
The essence of these problems is that, while principals seek incentive systems 
in which agents optimally carry out principals’ intentions, the agent’s behav- 
ior is typically difficult to monitor, his level of effort impossible to measure, 
or his performance imperfectly subject to verification, any of  which means 
that the agent knows something about the situation that is hidden to the prin- 
cipal. The agent exploits the private information, at a cost to the “optimal” 
execution of  the principal’s goals. The gains from specializing the agent’s 
expertise or ability induce principals to tolerate this agency cost. 
The “independence” of the Federal Reserve, that is, the space it has to pur- 
sue its own preferences, depends both on the heterogeneity of preferences of 
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on monetary policy reflects the importance of private information. How does 
the Fed operate? What determines voting outcomes in the Federal Open Mar- 
ket Committee (FOMC)? All the work on estimating monetary policy reaction 
functions represents an attempt to figure out what the Fed’s strategy is and 
what, if any, rules it might have been following. Does the Fed do what it says 
it is doing? And does it have the effect it is supposed to? These concerns make 
sense when the agent has considerable private information about the economy 
that the principals seek to discover through appointment and reappointment 
power, forced disclosure, and various threats of legislative intervention, major 
themes in the relationship between the president, Congress, and the Fed in the 
1970s. 
2.1.3  Implications for Institutional Design 
Studies of central bank laws and economic outcomes suggest some connec- 
tion between at least partial central-bank independence of  government and 
lower long-run inflation (Banaian, Laney, and Willett 1986; Parkin and Bade 
1985). The laws set a basic structure for interaction, but practically, in  the 
model discussed above, the Fed’s independence reflects both divergence of 
the principals’ goals and the agent’s private information. I model the Fed’s 
announced targets to  find  how  the goals of  monetary policy  get chosen, 
whether or not there is discretion, what the structure of choice is, what rules 
the Fed appears to follow, and how complex they are.2 I find no evidence of 
systematic deception, though one can see how  strategies of  ambiguity and 
obscurity on the Fed’s part serve to maintain the Fed’s at least partial indepen- 
dence. 
The final part of  the paper discusses institutional design and relates inde- 
pendence to accountability and effectiveness. Many economists seem disillu- 
sioned with maintaining Federal Reserve independence as a goal of  policy. 
For instance, Meltzer (1989) concludes his review of Federal Reserve policy 
with a plea for institutional reform to make the Fed more accountable, partic- 
ularly to the president. But empirical evidence and the model of  an agency 
relationship make it clear that such a change would have significant and un- 
desirable consequences beyond the ones he seeks. Similarly, Friedman (1985) 
seeks to coordinate presidential and congressional economic intentions better 
to guide monetary policy. But reducing the heterogeneity of  the principals’ 
preferences may reduce Fed independence even more than directly altering 
accountability procedures. 
Before taking up accountability, institutional design, and the consequences 
of different arrangements, I review major economic and policy developments 
of the 1980s, bureaucracy models (which treat the Fed as autonomous), and 
then agency models of Fed behavior with Congress, interest groups, and the 
president as principals. We  look first at Congress for an understanding of the 
institutional form of the Fed, then at the financial community to see its advan- 
tages in monitoring, and finally at the president, to unify the evidence of pre- 45  Ducking out of  the Storm: U.S. Monetary Policy 
election and partisan cycles in policy. I characterize the targets of  monetary 
policy directly from the records and indirectly by observing Federal Reserve 
actions and policy outcomes and consider whether the balance shifted be- 
tween domestic and international sources of policy choice, and why. 
2.2  The Economic and Political Context 
To make the topic manageably narrow, I treat the study of American mone- 
tary policy as a matter of explaining the causes and consequences of decisions 
taken by the FOMC. The FOMC comprises the chairman and other members 
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the presidents 
(only some of whom vote at any time) of  the regional banks of that system. 
Other agencies are also involved in aspects of monetary policy (for example, 
exchange rate management is really the responsibility of the Treasury) and the 
Federal Reserve has other responsibilities (often regulatory) that involve it in 
politics.  Nevertheless, say “monetary policy” and people think first of  the 
management of interest rates and the supply of money. 
With this view of  monetary policy, the natural place to begin a survey of 
the 1980s is actually in July 1979, with the appointment of Paul Volcker as 
chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. He served for eight years. I provide a 
description of the procedures and outcomes of monetary policy, starting with 
the first policy experiment. Then I place monetary policy in its domestic and 
international economic context and look at the instability of some important 
economic relationships underlying monetary policy. 
2.2.1 
The nature of  the experiment was  as follows. Briefly, in  the  1950s and 
1960s, monetary policy had  been oriented toward providing stable money 
market conditions with little systematic attention paid either to monetary ag- 
gregates or quantitative measures of  broader economic conditions. Starting 
just before the appointment of Arthur Bums as chairman in 1970, in response 
to developments in research and the economic record of the 1960s, the FOMC 
began a policy of manipulating the federal funds rate with a view to exercising 
some control over the growth of the money stock. In this period, both before 
and after a variety of congressional mandates to do so, the FOMC began pub- 
lishing “targets” of monetary policy, quantitative ranges within which they 
hoped to steer both interest rates and the money stock. Essentially, the proce- 
dure was one in which the FOMC intermittently chose long-term targets for 
money growth consistent with its broader objectives (e.g., stable prices), and 
then, at each subsequent meeting, chose a short-term target for the federal 
funds rate and related targets for monetary aggregates believed to be consist- 
ent with the long-term target. 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the outcomes and published short-term targets (as 
available) from 1970-88.  For the period up to  1979, the federal funds rate 
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Fig. 2.1  Announced targets and actual federal funds rate in  per cent, 1970- 
89; data have been slightly smoothed 
(fig. 2.1) was closely targeted,  while the money stock (fig. 2.2) generally 
missed even its short-term targets by  a good deal, usually on the high side, 
apart from a brief period in the mid-1970s. Meltzer (1989) reviews several 
accounts of this, including underestimates of  the demand for money as well 
as the effects of other shocks, but concludes that the Fed simply emphasized 
the interest rate targets and ignored the monetary targets. 
Hence the 1979 experiment. Announced on a Saturday to great confusion 
in money markets (and some within the Fed-see  Melton 1985), the reform 
gave greater emphasis in Fed decisions to the supply of (nonborrowed) bank 
reserves and less to interest rates.3 The idea was that a change in demand for 
money,  which  previously was  satisfied at an unchanged  interest rate by  a 
change in bank reserves, would now be satisfied at unchanged reserve levels 
by  a change in interest rates. Attention focused on the narrow money supply 
M1, and the goal of policy was to bring down the annual rate of growth of M1 
by  one percentage point a year for several years from the 9 per cent growth 
rate prevailing in 1980.4  The narrow money supply M1 grew exactly as hoped 
in 1981 and 1982, but the experiment ended some time in the late summer of 
1982. Then monetary growth leapt, with M1 growing by  11 per cent in 1983 
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Fig. 2.2  Announced targets and actual growth rate of money supply M2 in per 
cent, 1970-89;  data have been slightly smoothed 
Figure 2.1 shows that both the level and the variability of the federal funds 
rate and its targets increase between 1979 and 1982. The targets for money 
supply M2 (see fig. 2.2) bounce around a lot in  the period, and there are 
significant errors in outturns vis-his  targets, but clearly the variability of M2 
also declines during the experiment. For more or less the whole period it re- 
mains within the only published long-term target growth rate range, 6-9  per 
cent per annum. Since 1982, the federal funds rate has resumed tracking its 
targets almost as perfectly as before, and huge swings-again,  mostly on the 
up side-have  reappeared in money growth. 
For the 1980s as a whole, M1 growth is just under 8 per cent per annum, 
two points higher than in the 1970s, while M2 growth averages  just over 8 per 
cent, the same as it was  in the 1970s. As figure 2.2 showed, M2 growth is 
persistently higher in  the first half of  the  1980s, but lower in  1985-86.  In 
terms  of  broader  economic aggregates, table  2.1  shows that  the  policy- 
induced increase in unemployment in the early 1980s was underpredicted in 
the 1982 Economic Report of  the President of the Council of Economic Ad- 
visers (reprinted in Tobin and Weidenbaum 1988) and that the ultimate reduc- 
tion was achieved about two years later than initially expected. The inflation 
rate, by contrast, fell more rapidly than expected, though the long-run level 48  James E. Alt 
Table 2.1  Outcomes and Forecasts for the 1980s 
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seems to be about what was anticipated. However, the 1982 Report was not 
alone. Michigan consumer surveys show that people substantially overesti- 
mated the inflation rate in the early 1980s, and  surveys of  financial market 
participants show that,  after an initial steep drop in the long-run expected 
inflation rate between the end of  1980 and early 1982, expectations for the 
next decade stabilized at 6.75 per cent, about the value of  trend inflation to 
that time. Indeed, after the easing of monetary policy (the federal funds target 
was reduced from 12.5 to 9 per cent in August 1982), leading economists 
believed that the higher rates of money growth in 1983 would produce 9 per 
cent inflation in 1984. 
By  far the most optimistic forecasts of the Economic Report of  the Presi- 
dent dealt with fiscal policy, output, and investment.‘j Only in  the election 
years of  1984 and 1988 (nearly) did per capita disposable incomes reach the 
projected levels of the 1982  report (see table 2. l).’ In the longer term, real per 
capita output growth has been level at just above 2 per cent per annum since 
World  War  11,  and  (averaging the tax-cut-induced boom of  1984 with the 
recession of  1981) the 1980s are no exception. After the big surge in the early 
1980s, the cyclically adjusted, constant price federal fiscal deficit is now just 
a little larger than one would have projected a decade earlier from 1950-79 
data. Similarly, hopes that tax policy would durably affect investment proved 
illusory. Neither gross nor net private investment departs substantially from 
long-run trends (projected forward from 1979) across the 1980~.~ 
2.2.2  International Context 
The second “experiment,”  if it existed, corresponds to the period of decline 
in the exchange value of the dollar in and after 1985. It was certainly not the 
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orderly domestic monetary policy would curb disorder in international ex- 
change markets (1982 Report, p.  173), intervention to support the dollar was 
to be eliminated, or at most “minimal” (Sprinkel, cited in Melton 1985, p. 
172). However, traces of a second “experiment” appear in figures 2.1 and 2.2 
in the surge in money and easing of interest rates. But did the Fed bring down 
the dollar? The conjunction of a small and short-lived shift in domestic inter- 
est rate targets with a larger decline in the dollar’s exchange value (and surge 
in the money supply) suggest that policy change was minimal, geared to sig- 
naling and orchestration of market-led developments. However, the promi- 
nence in public political discussion of  international policy coordination sug- 
gests that we should try to determine more systematically whether, for how 
long, and to what extent, the period after 1985 reflected unprecedented atten- 
tion in monetary policy to concerns of international origin. 
However, international concerns in U.S. monetary policy are not new. The 
exchange value of the dollar intruded on domestic politics in the  1960s and 
1970s as well as the 1980s. Indeed, some argue that the 1979-82  experiment 
had  international origins, occurring only after Volcker was  convinced that 
without an increase in American interest rates the dollar and the international 
financial system faced a grave crisis. Others believe that the 1982 policy eas- 
ing was brought about by the possibility of a banking collapse caused by the 
effects of high real interest rates on Third World debt. Both these episodes are 
international aspects of domestic problems. Neither case really shows the Fed 
doing something for international reasons that it would not have done for do- 
mestic reasons. Thus, whether there really was a second experiment depends 
on whether international concerns became goals of  policy after 1985 in  an 
unprecedented way,  and whether monetary policy was actually coordinated 
(as opposed to being the subject of public discussion and negotiation) among 
nations. 
What was different in the  1980s? First, it was a period of  dollar strength 
and capital inflows. Figure 2.3 charts the real effective exchange rate of the 
dollar since 1967.9 The real dollar declines by  something like 30  per cent 
between  1970 and  1978, bottoms out  in  1979-80,  and, after  1980, com- 
mences a huge upward surge that lasts half  a decade before coming down 
(even quicker) and stabilizing around its 1973 levels in 1989-90.  Movements 
in net foreign investment, the capital inflow left after imports and net interna- 
tional transfer payments are subtracted from exports (the lower series in fig. 
2.3), closely follow the real exchange rate in the  1980s. In fact, they only 
share common trends; Granger-type  tests show that neither “causes” the other. 
Moreover, from the end of  1981 to 1985 American real interest rates (long- 
term bond yields minus expected inflation) were above-often  significantly 
above-the  range of comparable long-term real interest rates of the two prin- 
cipal substitutes for the dollar, the yen and the deutschmark. In the period of 
dollar weakness in the late 1970s the real return on dollars is below the substi- 
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Fig. 2.3  Real trade-weighted relative U.S. exchange rate, left scale, March 
1973 = 100 and net foreign investment in billions of 1982 dollars, right scale, 
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takes place in a context of growing dollar deposits outside the United States: 
the eurodollar market had grown enormously, from one-fortieth of M2 in 1965 
and one-tenth in 1970 to equality by 1980. 
However, the relationship between the dollar's  real  exchange value and 
American real relative interest rates was not new  in the 1980s. Possibly the 
direction of effects changes, from interest rates set for domestic purposes af- 
fecting exchange rates to interest rates set to affect the exchange rate having 
other domestic consequences. Moreover, other factors influence real exchange 
rates, and some of them are political. We  analyze these, and also describe the 
(limited) impact of international factors on American monetary policy, below. 
2.2.3  Changing Economic Relationships in the 1980s 
While output and investment remained close to long-run trend values in the 
1980s, some economic relationships involving money ceased to hold. For 
one, there is the well-known decline in the velocity of  money. The steady 
decline in the ratio of M1 to gross domestic product (a stable rate of growth in 
the velocity  of  money) through the  1970s changes abruptly in  the  1980s. 
Without predictable velocity, there is no point  in  trying to control money 51  Ducking  out of the Storm: U.S. Monetary Policy 
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growth. The cause of  the change, still disputed, could be technical changes in 
the definition of M1, unanticipated complexities in the money-income rela- 
tionship, or the impact of foreign demand (not pumped back into U.S. output) 
on the growth of M1 in the 1980s. 
Second, the relationship between money and inflation, loosely established 
over the 1960s and 1970s, also vanishes. A simple monetarist inflation model 
using quarterly M1 money growth plus its last four lags to project annual 
inflation in the quarter one year ahead, as shown in figure 2.4, does a good 
job of capturing broad contours of consumer price inflation from 1960  to 1979 
(though the peaks  of inflation, particularly in the 1970s, tend to overshoot the 
cumulated effects of money growth). But forecast forward from 1979-that 
is, fix the coefficients estimated for 1960-79  and simulate the effects of ob- 
served money growth in the 1980s-and  the model utterly fails to predict the 
inflation rate. In fact, the parameter estimates from the 1960s and 1970s pre- 
dict 20 percent inflation in 1987, and nothing in the model predicts the fall in 
inflation in the early 1980s. A parallel forecast (not shown) using M2  is less 
extreme, and does pick up the decline of inflation from 1979  to 1982, but also 
predicts double-digit inflation after 1985. Neither model predicts the lack of 
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-5  ,  1,11111111111 
2  4  6  8  10 
Unemployment  rate in per cent 
1947-1968 
tt+ 1969-1978 
-  1979-1989 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Fig. 2.5  Inflation rate based on consumer price index and unemployment rate, 
monthly, 1947-89; data have been smoothed 
Finally, figure 2.5 provides a historical chart of  inflation and unemploy- 
ment. It shows the broad contours of the trade-off in the years before 1969, 
with the recession loops of  1949, 1958, and 1961 visible along with the infla- 
tionary surge of the Korean War. Starting in 1969 there is first the Nixon loop, 
ending in the vertical inflation acceleration of inflation in  1973-74,  and the 
Ford-Carter loop, ending in the vertical acceleration of  1978. The counter- 
inflation policies of  the  1980s, neither immediately credible in the financial 
world nor the beginning of  an era of  stable money growth, had significant 
employment costs, but their extreme values lead ultimately back to values in 
the middle of the Nixon loop of 20 years ago. But are we a 4-point blip up 
in  inflation  away from  starting the  1980s over again? Or a  2-3  point  re- 
duction  away  from  getting  back  to  that  golden  age,  the  trade-off  of  the 
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2.3  Political Models of Monetary Policy-Agent  and Principals 
2.3.1  Inside the Fed 
The Federal Reserve has a broad mandate to manage money “in the public 
interest.” Most of  its decisions lack controversy and are made in secret, its 
Governors serve long terms, it controls its own budget. Thus, many econo- 
mists model the Federal Reserve as a unitary actor formulating monetary pol- 
icy to maximize social welfare. Even such an actor maximizes subject to be- 
liefs about how the economy works, so understanding its choices in the 1980s 
requires taking account of  the influence of  prolific scholarship by monetarist 
economists in the 1970s and later those interested in international coordina- 
tion of policy on policymakers’ views of  fundamental relationships between 
money,  inflation, interest rates, and  exchange rates. Economists are active 
pamphleteers on this supply-side of the market for ideas, but each policy ex- 
periment also shows how  the demand for “solutions” was  increased by  an 
unprecedentedly prolonged problem, inflation in the 1970s and the high real 
dollar exchange rate in  the 198Os.’O Diverse research staffs of  the regional 
banks ensures that new ideas get inside representation somewhere within the 
system, even if monetarism itself was resisted by many bank officials. 
Leaving aside the beliefs, whether the Fed is agent or independent, its ob- 
jectives need to be characterized. “Bureau” theorists treat the Fed as autono- 
mous and explain its behavior as self-interest on the part of Fed officials. For 
instance, the Fed earns revenue from interest on securities purchased in open 
market operations. It could be that the Fed maximizes revenue to maximize 
spending (Toma  1986) or employment (Shughart and Tollison 1986). How- 
ever, while the Fed consumes more when it earns more, neither paper shows 
that it generates excessive revenues. In fact, the Fed turns over most of  its 
excess revenue to the Treasury. It could also be that the Fed seeks to increase 
its influence (Beck 1988), an idea that is particularly important when the Fed’s 
regulatory powers are at issue. 
Finally, authors as diverse as  Chant and  Acheson (1986) and  Woolley 
(1984) stress the Fed’s goal of maintaining or increasing discretion, indepen- 
dence, or flexibility. Others suggest that “avoiding crisis” is its goal. But, by 
themselves, flexibility, independence, and crisis avoidance are Iess goals than 
operating procedures. Some independence comes with private information, 
and naturally the agent does not give it up. Moreover, some goals are being 
pursued even while attention is paid to the risk that things might get out of 
hand: crisis avoidance says nothing about what these goals are, beyond the 
ideas of bureau theory. 
Since a good deal of policy disagreement exists within the Fed, its policy 
goals may not be consensual. Voting behavior in the FOMC can be analyzed 
to describe the Fed’s “welfare function.” Though the chairman dominates Fed 54  James E. Alt 
decision making (see Kettl 1986 in leadership), even a strong chairman like 
Volcker was overruled on at least two occasions, once in  1984 and once in 
1986,” and dissents from FOMC directives are common. Woolley (1984,62- 
64)  pointed out that presidents of regional banks were more likely to dissent 
for tighter policy, while governors were more likely to dissent for easier pol- 
icy.  Moreover, he shows that over 80 percent of  those governors’ dissents 
favoring tightness were cast by  governors appointed by  Republican presi- 
dents, a point which takes on more significance in the context of the relation- 
ship between Fed and president (below).‘* 
2.3.2  Congressional Politics and Oversight 
The traditional view of the relationship between the Federal Reserve and 
Congress is that, while the Fed is technically subject to congressional control 
and is an agency created by the Federal Reserve Act, which can be amended 
by Congress, the relationship remains largely symbolic. Of course Congress 
(with the president’s consent) could change the Fed’s status, and legislation is 
frequently introduced with  that  purpose.  However,  this  legislation rarely 
passes, and, on the whole, while Congress has sought more information about 
monetary policy and complains vocally when interest rates are high, it has 
never moved positively to take direct control of  monetary policy. Moreover, 
Congress does not appropriate the Fed’s budget, and thus the Fed avoids nor- 
mal congressional oversight. 
In fact, the Fed is an example of what McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) call 
“fire-alarm oversight.” The Fed’s mandate is broad and vague. Such a mandate 
promotes the possibility of regulatory capture by the affected industry, whose 
activities facilitate the reelection of congressional representatives. The costs 
of such capture to the public are widely dispersed. As long as the industry is 
content, Congress is as well, and hence Congress attends to policy only when 
it gets complaints from interest groups-the  fire alarms. When divisions ap- 
pear wifhin the financial community, not only the Federal Reserve but also 
representatives of  different sectors within the financial industry become di- 
rectly involved. Financial deregulation legislation in the  1980s-“nonbank 
banks”-was  a case where a wide division of interest between smaller and 
larger institutions coupled with changes to and fro in composition of congres- 
sional  committees produced  years  of  legislative initiative  and  frustration 
(Woolley 1988b). 
Does Congress influence monetary policy anyway? Grier (1988) argues that 
politicians who especially need to serve constituents with policies requiring 
monetary outcomes will join the committee that controls monetary policy. If 
the committee has veto power, then there will be an equilibrium in policy 
reflecting the committee median policy position. If the committee chairman 
has a veto, it will be the chairman’s policy that dominates. Thus changes in 
committee chairs-or,  more specifically, changes in the relative distance of 
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dian-produce  changes in policy. Direct congressional  hearings or control are 
not required, since ex post threats to reduce the Fed’s independence (that is, 
to amend the Federal Reserve Act) are sufficient to extract compliance. 
Three testable empirical propositions follow from this model of  Fed  as 
agent and Congress as principal. There should be (1) self-selection onto the 
banking committees of representatives with strong banking interests in their 
constituencies, (2) attempts by Congress to reduce the Fed’s private informa- 
tion to improve monitoring and verification of performance, and (3) monetary 
policy changes corresponding to changes in the preferred policies of congres- 
sional chambers, committees, and chairs. 
Bank PACs concentrate donations to Banking Committee members (Wool- 
ley  1984, 135). Woolley (1988b) demonstrates self-selection, with banking 
committee members’ districts overrepresenting  the national average in savings 
and loans and real estate presence by about 2: 1. These representatives are the 
“high demand” preference outliers that populate committees. Krehbiel(l991) 
cites Shepsle’s (1978) evidence that the best predictor of requests for Banking 
and Currency is “financial or real estate occupational background” to support 
information-economizing  in committee appointments, as Congress organizes 
efficiently to discover the agent’s private information but waits for specialist 
interest groups to raise the fire alarms. 
Second, there was a flurry of congressional activity over information in the 
1970s. Ultimately the GAO was authorized to audit the Fed’s administrative 
practices, if not its monetary policies. Kettl(l986) reports that the Fed cut in 
half the time it waited to release FOMC directives in 1975 “to deflect congres- 
sional pressure for full disclosure.” Confronted with an adverse court decision 
in a Freedom of Information Act suit in 1976, the Fed reduced the delay still 
further, but at the same time cancelled its long-standing policy of keeping (but 
publishing with greater delay) minutes of its meetings. Other legislation  com- 
pelled the Fed to publish its targets and the chairman to report to Congress on 
them. (However, Fed chairmen can generally cloak themselves in vagueness, 
and there has frequently been little understanding of monetary policy in Con- 
gress.I3)  Peterson and Rom (1988) report that chairmen of the Fed frequently 
take the opportunity of  a visit to Congress to criticize fiscal policy. While a 
partially successful effort was made to lower the costs to Congress of monitor- 
ing Fed behavior, the Fed was able to maintain the secrecy with which its 
decisions had traditionally been taken. Woolley (1984) gives an excellent his- 
tory of the debates over Congressional attempts to increase scrutiny of (if not 
responsibility for) monetary policy. In fact, while the toothless measures that 
ultimately passed led scholars to conclude that Congress was largely irrelevant 
to monetary policy, if  Congress was trying to preserve fire-alarm oversight, 
but increase its-or  even more, financial interest groups’-ability  to monitor 
the Fed, this conclusion is misleading. 
Grier (1988) claims that significant changes in monetary policy coincide 
with ideological changes in Senate Banking Committee chairs but changes in 56  James E. Alt 
1980 make this ambiguous.I4  In a recent paper I have been unable to obtain, 
Ferejohn and Shipan report a similar finding for the House. Belden (1989) 
reports a consistent but statistically insignificant difference in the likelihood 
of bank presidents’ dissents when Proxmire was chair compared to Sparkman 
and Garn. All this is possible, but not conclusive. A note of caution: Grier 
closes his paper with the prediction that the change from Garn back to Prox- 
mire after the Democrats regain the Senate in 1986 should produce monetary 
easing. A glance at figure 2.1 shows that it does not. 
One other thing is clear. Widespread distress and anger over high interest 
rates gets Congress to take public positions decrying monetary policy. The 
flurry of  congressional activity in the mid-1970s was triggered by  the  1975 
recession. During the  1979-82  experiment, many bills were introduced in 
Congress, including proposals condemning high interest rates, requiring the 
president to assure adequate affordable credit to small borrowers, requiring 
the Fed to abandon money targets and reintroduce targeting of interest rates, 
and even one to impeach Volcker (Woolley 1984). Kettl(l986) produces more 
systematic data on congressional attention, which are measured as the total of 
congressional  bills and resolutions each year addressed to the Federal Reserve 
or monetary policy. I extended his data through the 1980s, and over half the 
variance in congressional attention, year to year from 1950 to 1988, can still 
be explained by  a simple regression model involving only the current short- 
term interest rate.I5 From the point of view of individual constituents (unlike 
interest groups), this congressional position taking and blame shifting domi- 
nates Grier’s “distributive politics” view of monetary policy: the geographic 
basis of  the distributional consequences of  policy are insufficiently clear to 
justify the sort of specialization  to committee oversight required by his theory. 
2.3.3  The Financial Community 
The Fed’s broad mandate along with heavy congressional involvement in 
intrasectoral disputes and blame shifting when interest rates are high are all 
consistent with the model of  financial community as coprincipal. The finan- 
cial community has all the usual resources discussed when an industry “cap- 
tures” its “regulators.” It has information that the Fed needs, and it supplies 
personnel  through circulation and  recruitment of  staff. Many  staffers and 
FOMC members come from financial industry backgrounds and expect to re- 
turn. For example, when Robert Heller quit the Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors (citing low salaries), he became vice president of a bank. 
The financial community is clearly able to monitor Fed behavior. The Fed 
and the financial community interact frequently. Goodfriend (1988) points out 
that business representatives serve as reserve bank directors. There is regular 
contact with the financial community through the New York Fed. Formal con- 
tact through the Federal Advisory Council and informal contact through meet- 
ings coexist. The regional bank presidents provide direct representation on 
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ness about Fed  policy (Woolley 1984). Since the interest groups rarely go 
public (except on regulatory matters)-that  is, the fire alarms do not go off 
too often-they  must have alternative strategies for monitoring. 
What the financial community seeks is generally taken to be stability and 
predictability in  market conditions (Poole 1976). Fed performance will be 
easily verifiable, since both open market operations and the stability of inter- 
est rates are routinely observed. In fact, the main argument against the view 
that the financial community is the Fed’s principal (though not against their 
desire for stability) is the community’s broad opposition to the monetary tar- 
geting experiment (Woolley 1984). 
Does the experiment show that the financial community ceased to obtain 
interest rate smoothing from the Fed? Hardly. First, a glance at figures 2.1 and 
2.2 shows that interest-rate smoothing seems far more important than mone- 
tary stabilization. There is more variance in interest rates 1980-82  (and less 
than usual in monetary targets) but closer inspection shows how briefly this 
lasts and how interest-rate smoothing has reasserted itself. The Fed’s interest- 
rate targets vary a little more in the 1980s than in the 1970s, and of  course 
since 1980 it has only published a 4 percentage point range, not an individual 
target value. Nevertheless, the impact of the “experiment” was smaller than 
one might believe from some of the contemporary descriptions. 
Table 2.2 formalizes this with estimates of an error-correcting model (Da- 
vidson et al. 1978) of the target-setting function. The error-correcting model 
is of the form 
AT  = (Y  + PAX  + y(T-, -  6X 
where AT  is the latest change in the announced target, AX is the latest ob- 
served change in the federal funds rate or money supply, and T- and X- are 
most recent observed levels. The parameters to be estimated include any sec- 
ular trend (the constant, a),  the short-run effect of the last observed change in 
outcomes(p), and the effect of the long-run, cast as a reequilibration rate (y) 
of the deviation of the last target from its equilibrium level fix-,  . The results 
for the federal funds rate are easy to understand. For the whole period, they 
show that 70 percent of the last change in interest rates is accommodated in 
the current change in the target. That is, changes in the target follow changes 
in  the outcome, but  damp the extent of  the changes.  Coefficients hardly 
change in the short period of the experiment, though the mean change is larger 
by a factor of  six and the standard error of the regression is bigger by a factor 
of two, indicating greater target variability in this period. The reduction in the 
6 coefficient suggests that the equilibrium level of interest rates was now be- 
low the observed level during the period, which is believable given double- 
digit interest rates. 
With respect to monetary targeting, no monetary variable-base,  free re- 
serves, or M2  changes-ever  appears significantly in the target equation. The 
overall structure remains the same in the policy experiment period as in the 58  James E. Alt 
Table 2.2  Error-Correction  Model of Monetary Targets, 1974-88 
Whole Period  1979-82  Experiment 
Equation (l), federal funds rate: 
a  .05 
P  .70* 
Y  -  .35* 
F  1 .O* 
R2  .54 
Observations  176 
SE  .58 
Equation (2), money supply M2: 
a  2.42* 
Y  -  .28* 
6  .03 
R2  .12 
Observations  176 
SE  1.1 
P  .08 
.70 
.69* 







-  .52* 




Note:  Data are from Citibase and the Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues. Targets in months 
in which the FOMC did not meet are given their previous values. 
‘Coefficient  is significant at .05 level or better. 
whole period, one of return-to-normality targeting around an exogenous, un- 
changing long-run target level. The reequilibration coefficient is twice as high 
in the short period, so the pull back to equilibrium target level from deviations 
is  stronger. Hence, targeting appears to follow orthodox monetarist recom- 
mendations: a single long-run target for money growth with much closer at- 
tention paid to complementary short-run money growth targets during the pol- 
icy experiment. That, with the reestablishment of  interest-rate  smoothing after 
1982 suggests that the financial community continues to get what it wants 
most, which is stable and predictable operating conditions. 
2.4  The Political Monetary Cycle with the President as Principal 
2.4.1  Cyclical theories 
There are two political-cyclical theories of macroeconomic policy. One, the 
“political business cycle,” predicts that reelection desires of  politicians lead 
them to create desirable economic conditions immediately before elections, 
even if these policies require costly adjustment later. If a short-sighted elector- 
ate rewards governments for such behavior, the electorally induced cycle cre- 
ates unnecessary costs (Nordhaus 1975). The other, “partisan theory,” predicts 
that partisan governments deliver benefits to their core constituencies. Eco- 
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stituencies, and  politicians deliver these redistributions through economic 
policy. Modifications have been proposed since Hibbs’s (1977) original work 
on partisan preferences for unemployment and inflation, but all predict policy 
changes of a redistributive nature in post-election periods. 
While Hibbs predicted policy changes persisting across entire incumben- 
cies, others have proposed that post-election effects should be transitory. For 
one, rational economic models imply that private-sector adjustments will off- 
set political shocks, at least once the “surprise” of  discovering which party 
wins the election has worn off (Alesina and Sachs 1988). Alternately Chappell 
and Keech (1988) propose that rising inflation may raise the cost of reducing 
unemployment (and vice-versa) beyond what a support-maximizing govern- 
ment would pursue. Also, the need to build new  coalitions dictates policy 
changes once the “debt” to one’s supporters has been paid off (Alt 1985). The 
evidence suggests that post-election policy shocks-when  observed-have 
had transitory effects, but the reasons have not been tested against each other. 
However, some find the theory inapplicable to American monetary policy, 
citing the Fed’s “independence’’  or the neutrality of anticipated monetary pol- 
icy.  The empirical evidence-which  should really be  decisive-is  divided. 
Scattered findings support the pre-election theory in monetary policy (e.g., 
Grier 1984; Haynes and Stone 1988) while others contradict it (Beck 1987). 
Chappell and Keech (1988) show that post-election effects appear to exist but 
have limited impact on the real economy. 
I unify these two theories in a simple model in which both pre-election and 
post-election effects could appear, but in which the timing of the chairman of 
the Fed’s  appointment has a critical role in  determining monetary policy.’6 
This model also helps us understand some important, but more anecdotal, 
questions raised by the first policy experiment, given our political theories of 
monetary politics. For one, the experiment employed monetarist procedures 
and targeted money and inflation to an unprecedented extent. Partisan theory 
makes the fact that Volcker, who spearheaded the experiment, was appointed 
by  a Democratic president seem anomalous. Moreover, the apparent begin- 
ning of a credit squeeze in an election year (1980), with an incumbent running 
for reelection, seems to contradict political business cycle theory. We will take 
up these episodes after discussing the model and the other evidence. 
2.4.2  Reappointment Politics 
If  the president is the Federal Reserve’s principal, his ability to set incen- 
tives has to derive ultimately from one of three sources: the power of appoint- 
ment,  the president’s influence over nonfinancial economic policy,  or the 
strength of moral suasion, which inheres in elected representatives with pop- 
ular mandates to change policy. The last exists, but it wears off quickly after 
elections. Influence over nonfinancial policy is most important when coordi- 
nation with other executive agencies is most useful or necessary for successful 
execution of monetary policy, as, for example, when an internationally coor- 60  James E. Alt 
dinated intervention is an  object of  policy. Beck (1982) points out that ap- 
pointment power is limited. Fed governors, after all, serve 14-year terms, and 
the presidents of the regional banks are not subject to presidential removal. 
There is indirect evidence of presidential influence on FOMC voting. Re- 
call that Woolley (1984) showed that voting for easier or tighter policies var- 
ied with partisanship of the appointment. Moreover, in the FOMC governors 
vote differently from regional bank presidents. Gildea (1987) shows that Fed- 
eral Reserve Board Governors’ political affiliation affects how likely they are 
to  vote  for noncontractionary policies:  self-described Democrats are more 
likely to favor easier policies. (Surprisingly, he does not check whether polit- 
ical affiliation covaries with party of the appointing president.) He also shows 
that whether governors’ (and again, other FOMC members’) vote for mone- 
tary ease apparently depends on the U.S. president’s current approval or dis- 
approval rating, though, of course, this disapproval rating is itself a weighted 
combination of current economic conditions (among other things). 
The president’s power to appoint the Fed chairman is more important. Po- 
litical business cycle theory makes the president’s desire for reelection a prime 
policy motive, but why should the president’s desire for reelection be so much 
stronger than the Fed chairman’s desire for reappointment? Obviously, the 
chairman’s problem is different: reappointment requires the approval of both 
the president and the financial community, each of which acts as a constraint 
on his desire to promote the interests of the other. Moreover, the interaction of 
the electoral cycle and the appointment cycle have clear implications for the 
strategy of a chairman seeking reappointment. 
Consider first the post-election period. The president has been elected, and 
he is aware that his early-term actions constitute an important signal to the 
electorate about policy. The Fed chairman, formerly up for appointment in 
year 2 of the presidential term, recently in year 3, has a clear incentive to give 
the president what he wants, at least initially.” If what the president wants is 
consistent with what the financial community wants, he has even more incen- 
tive to do this. The less common history the president and chairman share, the 
larger this same incentive. So one would expect to observe early-term mone- 
tary policy following the desire of  the elected president, more so when the 
president is new since first impressions count relatively more then, and more 
so when the president is a Republican, if there is closer convergence of pref- 
erences of the financial community and the Republican Party. This treats the 
interaction as an iterated game of incomplete information in which the presi- 
dent tries to discover the chairman’s “type,” before reappointing him, intro- 
ducing elements discussed in reputational models of monetary policy (Rogoff 
1985, 1987). 
By contrast, in the pre-election period, the chairman still wants reelection 
but is not certain who will be reappointing him. The temptation must exist to 
give the incumbent what he wants, more so when the incumbent’s reelection 
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reelected, the less he needs the chairman’s help. Essentially, the chairman 
must balance the probability of being seen to have offered a decisive advan- 
tage to whomever won with the probability of being seen to have offered a 
critical disadvantage  to whomever won (in spite of it). However, the chairman 
does not know who will win the election any more than anyone else does. 
Much depends on the visibility of the chairman’s actions. Since monetary 
policy is now followed closely in the media, significant actions are sure to be 
noticed. 
Hence his strategy should be to take a middle course, and not be seen to 
have done anything significant, in view of the fact that he gets another chance 
to maximize his reappointment probability after  the election, certain then of 
whom he has to please. Such a policy of not being seen, of “ducking out of 
the storm,” has at least two testable implications. Since you get noticed when 
you  shake things up, you keep things quiet: hence, the variability of targets 
should decline in the pre-election period, as large and frequent changes are 
avoided. Similarly, you get noticed when you step out of line: so the incentive 
to accommodate (e.g., fiscal policy) should also be strong. 
But there are further implications. In almost any version of rational expec- 
tations economics, only unanticipated monetary policy has real effects. “Giv- 
ing the president what he wants” post-election will be the easier, the bigger a 
surprise the reelection is. Clearly, when the election outcome is uncertain, 
some surprise is certain. But the surprise can bigger if the financial commu- 
nity expectations of Fed behavior are less clear. They could be made less clear 
by a deliberate policy of variability before the election. This sort of behavior 
is a feature of the model in Havrilesky (1987) and (without the electoral con- 
text) in Cukierman and Meltzer (1986). However, while this would increase 
the value of the post-election policy, it conflicts with the chairman’s best pre- 
election strategy of not being noticed. The chairman’s choice will depend on 
his attitude toward risk. 
Finally, you cannot “give the president what he wants” if he does not want 
anything. “What he wants” is what the central economic issues and promises 
of the campaign indicate policy should be. That may not seem to be much of 
a restriction, since 1972, 1976, 1980, and even 1984 all featured campaigns 
with evidently central economic themes that had implications for monetary 
policy. It is less clear that the 1988 campaign called for a major innovation in 
monetary policy as an essential ingredient of the president’s program. This 
general rule, that elected politicians do not rush off  to do something they have 
not bothered to promise to do, was a strong result of earlier work on partisan 
cycles in unemployment rates (Alt 1985) and should be a source of variability 
in the monetary policy cycle as well. 
To  sum up,  the presidential-principal-political monetary cycle is rooted 
equally in the (constrained) reelection and reappointment motives of the prin- 
cipal and agent. It is contingent on visibility: the chairman’s decision rule 
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comes from fear of being dragged into the campaign. Presidential suasion or 
legitimacy of the electoral mandate and the chairman’s reappointment motive 
coincide in the post-election period, so it is here that presidential influence on 
monetary policy should be greatest, with form and extent varying as described 
above. While the shocks could be big, they should be transitory. If there is a 
pre-election cycle in monetary policy, it should more recently be a by-product 
of accommodation or caution, as the visibility and attention paid to monetary 
policy has increased. The next sections show that quantitative evidence, ex- 
tended where possible to include the 1980s, is reasonably consistent with this 
model. So are some brief and admittedly journalistic accounts of recent ap- 
pointment and reappointment highlights: some thoughts on Bums’s quest for 
reappointment in 1977 and Volcker’s in 1983, and a view of why Carter chose 
Volcker in spite of the Democratic preference for easier monetary policy. 
2.4.3  Ducking out of the Storm 
There is a little recent evidence of pre-election cycles. Hibbs’s (1987) his- 
tory of  the Carter administration shows it was the opposite of  the political 
business cycle, with the boom first and the contraction before the election. 
The Reagan incumbency looks just right, but it is a Republican presidency, so 
the pattern of recession early and boom later is also consistent with partisan 
theory. From 1984 to 1988, unemployment trends down (like 1964-68),  of- 
fering no evidence either way.  However, growth in real personal income is 
highest in the two presidential election years in the 1980s, as the literature on 
economics and election outcomes predicts (see table 2.1). 
But if there is a political business cycle in real per capita disposable income 
growth, are its origins in monetary policy? The first part of table 2.3 shows 
Table 2.3 
Year  he-election Growth Rate  Year  Post-election Growth Rate  Party 
1960  -2.2*  1961  +2.1  Dem 
1964  1.1  1965  + .6  Dem 
Money Growth Differences before and after Elections 
1968  2.7  1969  -3.8  Rep 
1972  1.8  1973  -  2.4  Rep 
1976  .8  1977  -b 2.4  Dem 
1980  -  1.8*  1981  -  .7  Rep 
1984  -  1.8*  1985  +  4.7*  Rep 
1988  -  8.4*  1989  -3.2  Rep 
Nore:  Entries  are annual  growth rates of  M1  in percentages.  Post-election rate is  Decernber- 
December, minus the average of  the two previous years (source: Economic Report ofrhe Presi- 
denr 1989). Pre-election growth rate is the average of the monthly changes over the election year 
minus the  average of  the previous  two years (source:  Citibase). Dem  =  Democrat; Rep  = 
Republican. 
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that, while money growth accelerated in the year before a presidential election 
(relative to the two-year average before) in 1964, 1968, and 1972 (statistically 
significantly so only in 1968 and 1972, according to Hibbs 1987), the effect 
in 1976 is smaller and in the 1980s there is never a positive pre-election surge 
in monetary policy. This implies that the empirical evidence for and against 
an American political-monetary cycle may rest on the choice of  the period 
examined. Anyone who continues to include pre-1972 data (observation of 
which led to the theory in the first place) is likely to find a four-year cycle; 
this is less likely for anyone using the post-1972 period. 
This does not mean there is no pre-election politics of  monetary policy, 
however. The “credit crunch” of March 1980 is sometimes cited (Beck 1987) 
as contrary to political business cycle arguments, but there was an even more 
extraordinary back-off in targets and policy across the summer of  1980. The 
decision to raise the federal funds target in March was more than reversed over 
the next two months, leading to wide swings in money growth over the year. 
While Mayer (1987) quotes Volcker at the time as saying “the sooner the 
recession begins, the better,” the rapid policy reversal suggests that his carte 
blanche from the administration to reduce inflation was actually a postdated 
check, meant to take effect no sooner than late autumn. Greider (1987) alleges 
that when Volcker was outflanked by a majority favoring further tightness in 
the summer of  1984, he personally overrode the majority and instructed the 
open market operations desk at the New York Fed to maintain an unchanged 
course. Similarly, all the highest rates of money growth in 1988 are observed 
in the summer, as the actual money growth rate bows upward and stays above 
the targets all the while the targets are falling. All these episodes are the true 
pre-election politics of monetary policy, devices to stay out of trouble, keep 
policy from becoming too visible, hence “ducking out of  the storm.” 
Moreover,  Beck  (1987) claims that  statistical evidence of  variations  in 
money growth in election years cannot be found. However, he finds that Fed 
policy accommodates budget policy. If an electoral cycle in fiscal policy pro- 
duced increased demand for money before elections, the Fed would accom- 
modate  this,  introducing  pre-election  easing  apparently  without  policy 
changes. The Fed’s operating procedures appear to continue to accommodate 
money demand at given interest rates. So in election years, if fiscal policy is 
the source of the cycle, prudent politics plus usual procedures dictate accom- 
modating it. This will hardly show up in statistical analysis, since accommo- 
dation is passive and not discontinuous. 
Finally, consistent with this view of pre-election politics, there is evidence 
that target variation from month to month declines in election years. This 
incentive to stay out of trouble follows from the visibility of policy, increased 
by  the more rapid publication of  agreed targets in directives after the mid- 
1970s. Table  2.4 shows that,  apart from the unnus horribilis of  1980 de- 
scribed above, with its big crunch in March cancelled in April until the elec- 
tion was over, monthly federal funds rate target variability is always lower in 64  JamesE. Alt 
lsble 2.4  lsrget Variability, 1974-88 
Standard Deviations of  Standard Deviations of 
Years  Observations  Targets of  Federal Funds  Targets of M2 Growth 
1976  12  .22  1.62 
Rest of  1970s  69  .73  1.35 
1980  12  1.73  1.81 
1984, 1988  24  .51  .72 
Rest of 1980s  72  .91  1.02 
the 12 months preceding the election (covering 1976,1984, and 1988) than in 
other years. It is not that the levels of targets are higher or lower, they are just 
less variable. This is less true for monetary targets, but for politically sensitive 
interest rates, the point seems to be to convey “no change.” Consequent on 
less target variability in election years, as above, is that money demand is even 
more likely to be accommodated if demand changes through the budget. 
2.4.4  Post-Election Partisan Cycle 
Evidence for the post-election partisan cycle in output (Alesina and Sachs 
1988) and unemployment (Hibbs 1987) is well known. Hibbs (1990) shows 
that this unemployment cycle induces (with lags) an inflation cycle that affects 
rates of return on stocks and bonds as well as corporate profits and disposable 
incomes. Moreover, the cycle appears to be monetary in origin, at least to 
some extent. The second column of table 2.3 shows that money growth in the 
immediate post-election year (measured December-December)  follows the 
partisan cycle neatly, though irregularly in size, save that 1985 is way out of 
line.’*  In every other case, the prediction of partisan theory is fulfilled and the 
president “got what he wanted” from the Fed. 
The absence of the cycle in 1985 probably does not mean that the partisan 
cycle is declining. Figure 2.6 shows forecasts from Hibbs’s (1987) monetary 
policy partisan model, estimated from 1953 to 1980. These are very similar 
to results he publishes based on data through part of  1982. These parameters 
are  then used  to forecast the model  through the  1980s, supplying money 
growth and inflation exogenously. The model is on course through the reces- 
sion, which implies that 1981-82  economic policy was not an outlier vis-a- 
vis long-run Republican post-election policy. The forecasts do not quite pick 
up the 1983 boom, which is bigger than expected, but are back on course for 
the 1984 election. It then misses the 1985-86  monetary expansion, the second 
policy experiment. However, by  1987-89,  the forecasts are back in range. 
Since the long-run model is still on course at the end of the period, the period 
offers no support for throwing out the model. 
Does the chairman run for reappointment? Martin apparently did so in 
1967, as revealed in documents from the time (Woolley 1984, 1 16). Greider 
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(consistent with partisan theory predictions about what the president would 
have wanted): “There was a rapid shift in monetary policy and it was designed 
to ingratiate Burns with Carter so he would be reappointed chairman” (1987, 
p. 346). Greider also contrasts Bums’s post-election expansion with the fact 
that he did not “play political games to help re-elect Gerald Ford.” Exactly. If 
you want to be reappointed and you do not know who will be doing the ap- 
pointing, caution before and cooperation after is the way to go about it. In 
1981, what Volcker wanted was what Reagan wanted (but see below), and 
Greider extensively describes Volcker’s hopes of  reappointment after 1984. 
Of  course, just as the president’s reelection motive is not the only source of 
policy, the chairman’s reappointment motive is not the only source. But incen- 
tives for it and its effect on post-election policy are strong.  l9 
So why then did Carter choose Volcker, who was known not to be a team 
player and who had strong anti-inflation preferences? Anyone who looks at 
the annual data in King and Ragsdale (1988) can estimate a model of president 
Per cent 
15  1  A 
-5  II,,,I,,I 
1977  1982  1987 
Month and year 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  . . 
+ t +  Forecasts 
-  Actual MI growth 
Fig. 2.6  Rate of growth of money supply M1 (quarterly changes at annual 
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approval ratings in the postwar period in which approval is increased by  the 
(longer-term) perception that the president’s party is best able to handle what- 
ever the individual regards as the most important problem facing the country, 
but reduced by the amount of current inflation (in peacetime; prolonged wars 
also reduce approval ratings).2o  By  1979 the cost of  living was  seen as the 
most important problem facing the country by 60 per cent of the public; it was 
the seventh straight year it had led the list, beating Watergate, energy, and 
unemployment in turn. So Carter faced a double problem in terms of his ap- 
proval rating. He needed to reduce inflation and be seen to be best able to do 
that; he needed a credible agent and he needed a solution. The reelection mo- 
tive explains the choice: Carter could not have been reelected without improv- 
ing his approval rating through improved inflation performance. 
2.4.5  Divided Government and Agency Independence 
The 1980s saw the longest period of divided partisan control of Congress 
in nearly a century, and having a president whose party did not control at least 
one House persisted throughout the decade. Does this have implications for 
monetary policy? That is, is the Fed’s latitude wider in a period of  divided 
government, when the preferences of the president and Congress are less uni- 
form? Generally, how does the number of principals and the heterogeneity of 
their preferences affect the Fed’s freedom of action and policy stability? 
Two principals can coordinate an agent’s behavior the more closely if they 
share similar preferences. If  two principals want different things, and cannot 
reach a stable bargain, even a closely controlled agent’s behavior could dis- 
play variability if  he alternates between principals’ preferences in choosing a 
course of action. But if  two very different principals can bargain and agree to 
choose an agent whose own strong preferences reflect their bargaining out- 
come, even a highly independent agent’s behavior will be stable. Add a third 
principal and the bargaining space may become more complex, but coordina- 
tion still works the same way.  For example, one principal (say the financial 
community) might have strong preferences for stability over volatility in mar- 
kets but is relatively indifferent across levels of aggregate economic activity, 
while the others (president and Congress) might have strong preferences over 
economic  activity but  not  volatility. However, they  could  still coordinate 
through bargaining and achieve stable policies by  appointing someone who 
would strongly wish to carry out the bargaining outcome, as described above. 
Hence, a lot seems to depend on the agent’s nature, as well as the princi- 
pals’ preferences. Volcker was chosen to implement a counterinflation policy 
in full view of feelings in the administration that he was no team player and 
might indeed prove difficult to control. His strength of commitment to these 
outcomes meant that the transitions through a period of  divided control of 
government did not matter much. Earlier in the period of unified party control, 
Carter had chosen as his Chairman G. William Miller, whom Greider de- 
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cause his desire to be cooperative immobilized him in the face of conflicting 
goals and  signals as inflation worsened. Policy might well have been  even 
more inconsistent under a “team player” in a period of divided government. 
In fact, splits over policy within the administration could have as much 
effect as divided party control of  Congress. If  the principal with reappoint- 
ment power lacks clear goals, the agent may have more latitude.21  The exten- 
sive  policy  disagreement  in  the  Reagan  administration between  supply- 
siders-who  felt the Fed’s policy during the first experiment was too severe, 
frustrating  the  recovery-and  monetarists had  two  related  consequences. 
First, there was a lot of  signaling from the administration, as Havrilesky’s 
(1988) index shows. In fact, his index, a count of published calls for changes 
in monetary policy by members of the administration, predicts a small part of 
changes in money growth (about 3 percent of  the variance) and is itself a 
function of economic conditions, like the congressional attention index.22  But 
signaling is what you do when you have no direct control over policy. Greider 
also recounts the efforts Regan made to get Volcker out in  1982-83  and re- 
place him with someone easier to deal with (presumably like Miller). Regan 
failed, apparently in the face of  strong support for Volcker in the financial 
community. This makes Ben Friedman’s suggestion (in this volume) that the 
financial community in the 1980s moved from supporting stability to prefer- 
ring volatility in markets extremely interesting, since it would mean that by 
1987 Volcker’s position was no longer that of  any of  the principals, and he 
was not reappointed. 
2.5  New Targets, Old Problems 
2.5.1  International Origins 
Those issues surround the domestic politics of monetary policy. The second 
experiment of the 1980s, reducing the dollar’s exchange value, would require 
a whole new paper, which would cover many of the same subjects. For ex- 
ample, differences between Carter’s multilateralism and Reagan’s more uni- 
lateral approach to foreign policy would figure in the story. The economic 
policy coordination literature had ups and downs, initially optimistic about 
improving policy, later foundering on empirical findings of small benefits that 
evaporated completely once even a little uncertainty or the possibility of error 
was  allowed  for.  And  the  Congress  would  certainly  appear,  particularly 
through the linking of  international money and trade policy, since the real 
effects of high real exchange rates are generally felt most directly through the 
pressure they exert on exporting and import-competing sectors. 
But was monetary policy, the actions of the Fed, different in this period? 
There was unprecedented international cooperation over at least the orchestra- 
tion of policy, from the Plaza Hotel meeting and agreement in September 1985 
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regular meetings of the “Group of  Seven,” and other countries certainly al- 
tered their interest rates and fiscal policy to accommodate the dollar. There 
was a further flurry of activity after the stock market plunge of October 1987, 
but by  1988 the dollar was no longer so obviously overvalued, and American 
real interest rates, though still high and positive, were at least no longer higher 
than GermanykZ3 
It might be tempting to conclude from all this that international concerns 
became a major element of American monetary policy in this period, but I am 
doubtful. There was some intervention in  exchange markets. Fiscal policy 
gestures were made about reducing the deficit. More important, the dollar’s 
decline began in the spring (March or May, depending on choice of measure- 
ment) of  1985, months before the Plaza meeting. After the peak  year for 
American real interest rates in 1984, there is a sharp reduction by  1985 which 
does reflect domestic policy: the target federal funds rate (that is, the center of 
the range that the FOMC now wrote into its directive) was lowered by  two 
percentage points over the last two months of 1984, nine months before Plaza, 
and shortly before the dollar’s decline began. The target was lowered by  a 
point and a half in the summer of 1985 (before  the Plaza meeting) and raised 
to its previous level again by September (see fig. 2.1). In fact, the federal 
funds rate itself hardly follows this downward blip: it is allowed to lie at the 
top of its range for a couple of months. This blip, like the reduction in 1984, 
may have been aimed at sending the dollar down, but it is quite clear that after 
1985, the harmonization of real interest rates owes at least as much to in- 
creases in  the German and Japanese rates as to reductions in the American 
rate. In fact, except for the brief blip in summer 1985-before  the “coordina- 
tion” got under way-the  federal funds rate target range is constant from De- 
cember 1984 to March 1986. 
Nevertheless, speculatively, two political questions seem to be  raised by 
this episode that deserve a systematic answer. First, exchange rates might have 
become a target of monetary policy at least for a while. Second, while real 
relative interest rate changes explain a lot about movements in the real dollar 
exchange rate, politics may have a role here too. 
2.5.2  Moving targets 
Interest rate stabilization was the goal of monetary policy, subject to peri- 
odic surges of  partisan  change and  occasional other  politically-motivated 
shocks. Woolley (1988a) estimates transitory shifts in policy weights on infla- 
tion and unemployment, with bursts of anti-inflationary policy in 1969 and 
1979.24  This (along with his failure to find  a surge in the weight on  anti- 
inflation policy in  1974-75) verifies systematically the interpretation of doc- 
umentary evidence by Romer and Romer (1989). 
Variations of both methods can be used to look at the question of exchange 
rates and interest rates, to see whether changing international conditions also 
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major targets were discussed in the FOMC directive as evidence of the priority 
they received in FOMC discussions. (The interpretation was originally made 
by  former Fed Governor Robert Heller, so it has surface plausibility.) Ex- 
change rates appear in spring 1985 (the first date for which data are provided), 
listed after  the  monetary  aggregate,  strength of  expansion,  inflation, and 
credit market  conditions.  Exchange rates reach  center stage briefly  in  the 
spring of  1987 and recede in importance after the events of  October 1987. 
Unfortunately, I could not reliably replicate Furlong’s list from my reading of 
FOMC directives, so I cannot extend the data back before 1985. 
More systematically, table 2.5 contains reaction function estimates for the 
federal funds rate, extending Woolley ’s (1  988a) moving regressions for over- 
lapping four-year periods from  1977-80  through  1986-89.  The dependent 
variable is the federal funds rate. Independent variables include a lagged de- 
pendent variable to stabilize the results, and the possible targets of policy, the 
inflation rate, unemployment rate, change in industrial production, change in 
the dollar-deutschmark exchange rate, change in money supply M1, and level 
of nonborrowed reserves .= 
These overlapping “moving” regressions imply that the federal funds rate 
responded only to inflation and money growth in the early years of  the policy 
experiment, and then, after the peak of the recession, there is some systematic 
evidence of a response to unemployment (rates come down in the face of high 
unemployment), and rates are also lowered when nonborrowed reserves are 
highest. After the 1984 election, inflation reappears along with (not quite at 
conventional significance levels) the dollar-deutschmark exchange rate,  at 
Table 2.5  Targets in Moving Regressions in the 1980s 
Lagged Target of Policy and Expected Sign 
Inflation  Unemployment  ADeutschmark  Nonborrowed  AM 1 






















Nore: The asterisk, *,  indicates coefficient from reaction is statistically significant at .05 level 
with the expected sign. The asterisk in parentheses, (*), indicates significance at .l  level with the 
expected sign. Moving regressions were estimated over 48 months for the time periods shown. 
The dependent  variable was the federal funds rate; its first lag was included and was always 
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least intermittently. Thus it is conceivable that the federal funds rate was react- 
ing to the exchange rate, but at most episodically and not very strongly. Any 
reaction to money growth disappears in the later years. None of this contra- 
dicts the Furlong-Heller data. The last two years were probably dominated by 
the aftermath of the stock market collapse, with the focus on credit market 
conditions explaining the absence of the usual targets from the reaction func- 
tion. 
2.5.3  Politics and the Demand for Dollars 
Historically, real exchange rates and relative interest rates are related, but 
what determines the preference for dollars at a given combination of exchange 
and interest rates? That is, monetary policy was certainly looser in  1978, 
tighter in 1982, but would 1982 monetary policy in 1978 have produced the 
same strength in the dollar? If not, what is the role of politics in the difference? 
Journalistic accounts of the strong dollar period abound with references to 
politics, and private conversations with investors suggest the importance to 
them of political stability. They seem to think about stability as the intersec- 
tion of two separate components, stability of the world and stability of  the 
United States, so: 
World 
U.S.  Stable  Unsettled 
Stable  $ less strong  $ very strong 
Unsettled  $ very weak  $ less weak 
That is, when the world seems to be in trouble but the United States does not, 
the dollar is at its strongest; when conditions are reversed, the dollar is at its 
weakest. My guess is that a stable United States in a stable world produces a 
stronger dollar than weakness on both sides. But can this be measured and is 
there any evidence for it? 
The United States looks most stable to investors when the approval or pop- 
ularity of the president is strongest, allowing for the cycles that exist in popu- 
larity. Reagan’s early term and  short so-far incumbency of  Bush have  the 
strongest ratings. Reagan after 1986 is much weaker, and Carter after 1977 
weaker still, though the lowest ratings of all are observed in the early 1970s. 
I have not  yet  systematically collected world  stability data back  into the 
1970s, so the equation in table 2.6 has omitted variable bias.26  The result is 
clearly interesting enough to merit continuing work. The real exchange rate 
partially adjusts to the current real interest differential between the dollar and 
the average of  its trading partners, and also to the real level of  the current 
account balance of payments. Independent of this, there is also a significant 
effect of the annual change in presidential approval. When this goes up, the 
real exchange rate goes up. I do not set too much store by this result, with all 
of 16 observations, but the general idea behind it-that  is, to look for political 71  Ducking out of the Storm: U.S. Monetary Policy 
Table 2.6  Determinants of the Dollar’s Surge and Decline 
Independent Variable  Estimated Coefficient  Robust Standard Error  r-Statistic 
Constant  29.3  22.7  1.3 
Lagged real exchange rate  .69  .23  3.0 
Interest rate differential  3.93  1.65  2.4 
Real current balance of pay- 
ments  10.9  5.06  2.2 
Change in presidential ap- 
proval  .47  .19  2.2 
Observations  16 
Corrected R2  .64 
Durbin-Watson statistic  2.22 
Note: Dependent variable was the U.S. real relative exchange rate. Data on exchange rates and 
interest rates is from International Financial Statistics, various issues. Balance of payments data 
is from Citibase. Popularity data is from King and Ragsdale (1986). 
factors that influence market judgments about the relative values of  curren- 
cies-seems  worth following up. 
2.6  Conclusions 
The congressional choice of  regulatory design produced an institution in 
which the demand for stable financial market conditions would normally be 
attended to, but in which both Congress and the president could have an influ- 
ence on monetary policy. This agency framework, and particularly the inter- 
action of the president’s reelection motive and the Fed chairman’s reappoint- 
ment motive, provided incentives for pre-election monetary cycles to be weak 
and post-election cycles to be strong. Of course, big parts of the explanation 
of monetary policy lie in less systematically explored factors like the changing 
ideas of economists and changes in the structure of  world financial markets. 
But even if each of the systematic political effects we discussed only explain 
a small part of the variation in outcomes, they cumulate: 5 per cent here, and 
5 percent there,  and pretty  soon it  starts to add up to a political model of 
monetary policy. 
It is important to note that it is not a question of “Which model is right?’ A 
focus on multiple principals instead points to several systematic incentives 
that exist simultaneously. Multiple principals means changing goals, and for 
the Fed it means partial independence and room for maneuver. Partial inde- 
pendence-that  is, limited discretion for the Fed with the possibility of pres- 
idential control only at a cost to the president-is  a solution to the “rules 
versus discretion” problem that economists have argued over for several years 
(Lohmann 1990). At least partial independence in the central bank is worth 
having, in terms of lower long-run inflation. Moreover, we have seen that Fed 72  James E. Alt 
policy has been quite consistent vis-&+is its principals. In spite of  the oft- 
alleged incentives it has to exploit its private information to engineer sur- 
prises, in  fact it seems to follow a simple rule, namely, to smooth interest 
rates. It does a good job of it since the relevant principal, the financial com- 
munity, is rarely vocal. Whether the Fed does what it says is harder to say, 
since money growth makes inconsistent appearances in Fed’s reaction func- 
tions. Hence, it may have pursued a consistent policy, even if  it has not con- 
sistently pursued the goals economists would have liked. 
Bills are introduced in every Congress to make the Fed more accountable, 
and  economists often  suggest institutional reforms.  Some suggestions re- 
viewed by Clark (1989) include prompt announcement of FOMC decisions, 
compulsory publication of  Fed budgets, annual publication of  targets with 
presidential removal of the FOMC for failure to achieve them, adding the 
Secretary of  the Treasury to the board and FOMC, and Senate approval of 
regional bank presidents. Prompt announcement might induce speculation, 
undercutting credit market stabilization without aiding any other principal, 
but of  each of the others the same thing can be said. Add  a power, aid in 
discovery, and reform strengthens the relevant principal. Hence each reform 
makes it more likely that the affected principal will get what he wants, rather 
than what the reformer wants. Let the president dismiss the FOMC and they 
will not only work to hit targets but choose ones the president wants. This 
(like putting the Treasury Secretary on the FOMC) will reinforce the existing 
partisan cycle and promote the “team player” Fed behavior characteristic of 
Miller’s term as chairman. The empirical evidence on congressional behavior 
is inconclusive, so the effect of  adding a congressional power is uncertain. 
Probably no amount of power and information would create a geographically 
redistributive “pork barrel” in credit allocation. If this cannot be done, which 
seems likely, then Congress will continue not to vote itself powers that have 
no electoral return, and the blame-shifting attention cycle will continue to 
characterize congressional involvement. 
However, the reappointment-reelection cycle discussed above has impor- 
tant implications for the most popular current proposal for institutional re- 
form. Meltzer (1989) concludes his review by  suggesting that the president 
should be able to appoint the chairman upon taking office, in order to ensure 
cooperation with the president’s program. This proposal featured prominently 
in the bill introduced in  1989 by Representative Lee Hamilton, chairman of 
the Joint Economic Committee. But we have seen that the agency relationship 
that exists produces strong incentives for the Fed  to give the newly elected 
president what he wants, regardless of partisanship. Immediate appointment 
upon election would not necessarily add to this incentive.*’ 
Paradoxically, it would change the pre-election incentives. Under the exist- 
ing system, the chairman, not knowing who will win, has incentives to duck 
and leave existing policy intact. Under the proposed reform, a chairman can 
only try to keep his job by throwing everything into the president’s reelection 73  Ducking out of the Storm: U.S. Monetary Policy 
effort since, if the incumbent loses, the chairman is out of a job no matter 
what he has done before the election. Hence incentives to run a pre-election 
monetary cycle, absent under the present system at least since monetary pol- 
icy became broadly more visible, would reappear if the system were changed 
to allow the president immediately to appoint a new chairman. So the positive 
analysis of policy undertaken here turns out to have relevance for contempo- 
rary debates about the design of institutions, as well. 
Notes 
1. This paper ignores the activities of the Federal Reserve System in coordinating 
and regulating banking activities, restricting attention to the management of  interest 
rates and money stock carried  out by  the Federal Open Market Committee, whose 
membership includes the appointed Board of Governors (including the chairman) of 
the Federal Reserve, as well as presidents of the regional banks. Good recent reviews 
of the institutional structure are available in Woolley (1984), Melton (1985), and Kettl 
(1986). 
2.  These positive questions complement normative discussions by  economists on 
“What should the goals of monetary policy be?’  and “Should there be discretion or 
should the Fed follow rules?’ 
3.  Controversies abound over whether the Fed should have targeted total or nonbor- 
rowed reserves and have used lagged or current reserves accounting procedures (they 
changed to using current reserves in 1984). 
4.  According to congressional  testimony of  Treasury Undersecretary Sprinkel in 
July  1981, the annual growth rate of  money MIB was supposed to decline by  one 
percentage point per annum from seven in 1981 to three in 1985 (cited in Hibbs 1987, 
287). The experiment was backed by the Administration: the 1982 Report of the Coun- 
cil of Economic Advisers (republished in Tobin and Weidenbaum 1988) gave a central 
role to reducing inflation, which it described as “essentially a monetary phenomenon” 
5.  By  early  1982, M1 was growing more slowly than the overall level of  prices. 
This “real” contraction is reflected in the severity of the recession induced by the policy 
experiment. 
6. “Implausibly  optimistic”  is Hibbs’s (1987) phrase;  the “economics of joy”  is 
what Stein (1988) calls it. The optimism conjoined the monetarist belief in the possi- 
bility of a painless adjustment to lower inflation rates through the change in inflationary 
expectations upon announcement of a simple and credible anti-inflation policy and the 
hoped-for “supply-side” effects on investment and output of lower marginal tax rates. 
7.  The Report projected real personal disposable income; table 2.1 gives the outturn 
in per capita terms. Population growth slows in the 1980s, making per capita growth 
performance look better compared to earlier decades, but the change in the projections 
into per capita terms would have only minimal effects. 
8. Net investment would be below trend except for a surge in housing-related in- 
vestment in the mid-1980s.  Extrapolations are polynomial trends fitted to the invest- 
ment series in unlogged constant-price form. 
9.  “Real” means the dollar exchange rate vis-his the currencies of the U.S. trading 
partners, weighted by trade volume, net of their relative price levels. This netting out 
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of relative inflation removes from the chart that part of changes in nominal exchange 
rates that offset international inflation differentials. 
10. Woolley (1984, chap. 5) relates economists’ academic backgrounds to policy 
ideas.  Gildea (1987) suggests that members of  the Board of  Governors have back- 
grounds that affect their propensity to dissent from FOMC decisions. 
11. In February  1986, Volcker’s opposition to easing was overruled by a majority, 
including several other Reagan appointees. This episode emphasizes the division over 
economic policy that existed in that administration. 
12. Belden (1989) shows that this finding continues to hold and also relates dissent 
to the different personalities of the chairmen and the extent of uncertainty about the 
economy. 
13.  See, e.g., the Republican threat to introduce a windfall tax on high interest rates 
in 1982. 
14. Grier (1988) proposes that the changes of chairs in the Congress from Patman 
to Reuss and Sparkman to Proxmire (both of whom were at the opposite-liberal- 
end of the ideological spectrum from their predecessors) in the mid-1970s and Reuss’s 
introduction of HR212  in spring  1475 were sufficient to persuade the Fed to lower 
interest rates. This would be an important observation, since the next big change would 
be expected when the Republicans gain the Senate in  1980, an event that coincides 
with the change in presidential control, but the implication that Patman was less in 
favor of low interest rates than Reuss is troubling. 
15.  The regression controls for odd and even numbered years, since more bills are 
introduced in the first year of congressional sessions, more than the difference in vol- 
ume of business in the two years. 
16.  Havrilesky (1987) proposes  a theoretical unification in which monetary sur- 
prises provide real stimuli to raise revenue to pay for other redistributive policies, but 
he gives little evidence in support. 
17.  This assumes that the chairman dominates FOMC voting,  an assumption for 
which there is evidence, but oversimplifies in ignoring the role of other advisors in the 
chairman’s appointment. 
18.  Output rises and falls in the second year after the election (Alesina and Sachs 
1988), so systematic money growth changes in that year (for which there is no evi- 
dence) would reflect accommodation. 
19.  Volcker held off easing to end the recession longer than someone trying to curry 
favor for reappointment would have, but he enjoyed tremendous support in the finan- 
cial community. Again, it seems that first actions speak loudest. 
20.  Presidential approval is increased by a half point for each percentage point of 
belief that his party is best able to handle the most important problem; each point of 
inflation takes two points off approval. 
21.  In fact, the chairman should worry more about the president than Congress, 
since he is appointed by the president without Senate consent, while amending the 
Federal Reserve Act without the president’s approval would require a supermajority in 
Congress. 
22.  Administration  calls for policy  could  induce changes in private demand for 
money which the Fed may accomodate by smoothing interest rates. Havrilesky does 
not test for this. 
23.  Recently, the G-7 agreement not to coordinate policy to alter the value of the 
yen was taken as further evidence that while the dollar was everyone’s problem, the 
yen was Japan’s. 
24.  He uses Brown, Durbin, and Evans’s (1975) method of moving regressions, in 
which the same regression is run over successive overlapping time periods in order to 
investigate shifts in the coefficients. 75  Ducking out of  the Storm: U.S.  Monetary Policy 
25.  The targets for the federal funds rate in FOMC directives could appear on the 
right-hand side here, too, but those targets accommodate changes in  the rate, whose 
behavior I analyze directly. Each new regression drops the first year of the previous 
one and adds an extra year at the end. Monthly observations are used. 
26.  To  generate  a  quantitative  indicator of  sentiment  about world stability, one 
could use a measure of  conflict or subjectively turn to the annual responses to the 
Gallup International survey (“Will the next year be one of  peace or of conflict?”) car- 
ried out in countries that are financial centers. Responses to this survey trend upward 
in the later 1980s, so dollar demand, ceteris paribus, should be considerably weaker 
than in the earlier part of  the decade, when the world was widely seen as more un- 
stable. 
27.  Clark (1  989) quotes Jerry Jordan as recommending the appointment take place 
a year after the president takes office. This would seem to be the most dangerous idea 
of them all, since a partisan chairman would now have clear incentives to run both the 
pre-election and post-election cycles in policy. 
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COlllmeIlt  Benjamin M. Friedman 
The centerpiece of James Alt’s thoughtful analysis of  U.S. monetary policy is 
his representation of the Federal Reserve System as an agent simultaneously 
serving three principals: the president, Congress, and the private financial 
markets. As is standard in principal-agent models, the objectives governing 
the behavior of the agent here are not merely to satisfy the objectives of the 
principal. Alt posits that Federal Reserve policymakers-including  especially 
the chairman-also  act so as to maximize prospects for reappointment when 
their terms expire. In addition to this specification of the familiar tension be- 
tween the objectives of  the principal and those of the agent, however, Alt’s 
multiprincipal model opens up another dimension of conflict. No one expects 
the president and Congress to agree at all times on the proper course of mon- 
etary policy, and the introduction of “the market” as yet a third principal only 
complicates matters further. The resulting framework for studying monetary 
policy is so rich with possibilities that it is surely no criticism of Alt to say 
that many of  its potential implications remain to be explored. 
In order to reach a model with so much potential richness, Alt must rely on 
many simplifying assumptions, some of which warrant closer inspection than 
he provides in his paper. Perhaps the most obvious of these is that entities like 
Congress or the financial markets-or  even the president-have  clearly de- 
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fined objectives that monetary policymakers can either seek to achieve or not. 
As Alt is well aware, modeling Congress in this way sidesteps a long-standing 
and  voluminous body of  thinking, ranging from the popular to the profes- 
sional, which analyzes the complexities of  an institution made up  of rep- 
resentatives of different political parties, different geographical regions, and 
different economic constituencies. Similarly, although in principal “the presi- 
dent” is a single individual, in practice the administration that the president 
heads also typically reflects at least some diversity of constituencies. AS the 
example of the open conflict between “monetarists” and “supply-siders” in the 
Reagan administration  clearly demonstrated, the resulting differences of opin- 
ion within the administration can and do bear quite directly on objectives for 
monetary policy. Imputing any very unified set of monetary policy objectives 
to participants in the private financial markets is likewise problematic. 
The ability to attribute unambiguous objectives to each of the three princi- 
pals in Alt’s model is not a mere nicety, but a central assumption underlying 
the model’s capacity to generate testable implications. For example, one half 
of  Alt’s conclusion about how  political forces influence monetary policy is 
that, in the period following a presidential election, the Federal Reserve tends 
to deliver the monetary policy that the new president wants. (The other half is 
that in the period leading up to a presidential election, the Federal Reserve 
tends to steer a neutral course.) In the 1980 election campaign, candidate Ron- 
ald Reagan harshly criticized the stagnation of  U.S. economic activity and 
placed major emphasis on the need to create new jobs. But Mr.  Reagan was 
just as critical of the current double-digit price inflation. Nor  did the intra- 
mural monetarists-versus-supply-siders  debate clarify the issue once the new 
administration had taken office. Unless the Federal Reserve was  operating 
under an economic model promising disinflation without recession-some- 
thing that neither the central bank’s internal discussions at the time nor subse- 
quent experience indicates is likely-how  was Paul Volcker to know whether 
the tight monetary policy that the Federal Reserve imposed in  1981 and the 
first half of  1982 was what the new president wanted? From the perspective of 
scholarly inquiry, how is the economist or political scientist to treat this obser- 
vation in submitting Alt’s model to empirical verification? 
A second central assumption of Alt’s model is that the private objective 
governing the behavior of  Federal Reserve policymakers (again, especially 
the chairman) in their capacity as agent is the desire for reappointment. The 
role of this objective is to motivate the central bankers not only to give a newly 
elected or reelected president the monetary policy he wants, but also to steer 
a neutral course in advance of the election so as not to risk alienating which- 
ever candidate wins. 
This assumption too bears closer inspection. To  begin, the institutional 
facts describing the job tenure of Federal Reserve Board members and Federal 
Reserve Bank presidents, both of  whom serve on the Federal Open Market 
Committee, render this hypothesized objective implausible except in the case 79  Ducking out of the Storm: U.S. Monetary Policy 
of the chairman. The bank presidents are formally appointed by the boards of 
directors of  their respective Federal Reserve Banks. Although input from 
Washington is often important in the initial appointment of a new bank presi- 
dent, it is typically not a factor in reappointment of an incumbent bank presi- 
dent to successive terms (which last five years). Each Board member is ap- 
pointed either for a full term of  14 years or for the unexpired portion of a 
currently running 14-year term. A member who has served for a full term is 
ineligible for reappointment. A member initially appointed to serve out an 
unexpired term is eligible for reappointment to one full term, but the very fact 
that so many Board appointments  are to fill out unexpired terms indicates that 
many Board members not only do not seek reappointment but, in contrast, 
choose to leave well before they have to. The average tenure of Federal Re- 
serve Board members appointed during the last three decades (not including 
those still in office as of the time of writing) has been less than six years. 
More important, it is not clear what implication of this key element in Alt’s 
principal-agent model provides a handle for empirically testing it. Even if one 
were able to document beyond doubt that the Federal Reserve adjusts mone- 
tary policy after each election to conform to the new president’s wishes, the 
counterexample of the U. S. Supreme Court-which  reportedly “follows the 
election returns” despite the justices’ life appointments-shows  that such a 
finding would not be strong evidence of a reappointment objective. 
What alternative objective might motivate the behavior of the Federal Re- 
serve in this principal-agent setting? One alternative that would be familiar to 
observers of many governmental agencies is that Federal Reserve officials at- 
tach great importance to preserving or even enhancing the position of the Fed- 
eral Reserve as an institution. In the specific case of the Federal Reserve Sys- 
tem in recent decades, this institutional objective has usually taken the form 
of seeking to protect the central bank’s independence: independence from di- 
rect intervention by the administration in monetary policy decisions (e.g., by 
putting the Secretary of the Treasury on  the FOMC, as was the case until 
1936), independence from “excessive” congressional interference, indepen- 
dence from GAO budget audits, and so on. (To be sure, it is possible to attrib- 
ute such institutional objectives to private motives too, but presumably those 
would not include the desire for reappointment.) 
What kind of principal-agent model might this alternative  objective for Fed- 
eral Reserve policymakers generate? I have suggested elsewhere that the ef- 
fective scope for independent monetary policymaking by the central bank in 
the United States is bounded on one side by the monetary policy sought by the 
administration and on the other side by that sought by Congress (again, as if 
these two entities had unambiguous objectives). When the president and the 
dominant forces in Congress differ sharply about monetary policy, the Federal 
Reserve has much room for genuine choice, and U.S.  monetary policy be- 
comes independent in reality as well as in theory. By contrast, when the pres- 
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proper course for monetary policy, the Federal Reserve has little choice but to 
deliver the policy that these two principals deem appropriate. As is consistent 
with  Alt’s discussion of  “divided  government and  agency independence,” 
therefore, this model implies that the available range within which the Federal 
Reserve makes monetary policy is at times fairly wide, but at other times quite 
narrow.  In this case the effective threat constraining the Federal Reserve to 
keep monetary policy within this range is that the president and Congress- 
acting togerher-have  the power to amend the Federal Reserve Act,  and 
therefore alter the Federal Reserve’s internal structure as well as its relation- 
ship to other parts of  the government, in whatever way  they choose. This 
discussion is not the place to carry out a comparative evaluation of this alter- 
native model and Alt’s; the point of the example is merely to show that other, 
very different models are equally plausible a priori. 
A further important consideration that does not appear explicitly in Alt’s 
paper, but that is entirely compatible with his model (or with my  suggested 
alternative), is that the desire to avoid financial crises has traditionally been 
an overriding concern of  monetary policymakers, one at least on a par with 
the macroeconomic objectives that Alt discusses. After all, the Federal Re- 
serve itself grew out of the reaction to the series of banking panics that had so 
disrupted not only the financial markets but U.S. economic activity more gen- 
erally in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the original 
Federal Reserve Act was explicit that the new institution’s chief charge was to 
avoid such episodes. Further, as Hyman Minsky has persuasively argued, the 
subsequent  decentralization of  lender-of-last-resort responsibilities  in  the 
1930s (importantly including creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor- 
poration) stemmed in large part from the recognition that the Federal Reserve 
had failed to protect the nation from just such a crisis following the collapse 
of Credit-Anstalt in May 193 1. 
Indeed, the desire of Federal Reserve officials to avoid a financial crisis fits 
easily into almost any principal-agent representation of the monetary policy- 
making process. In the context of Alt’s model based on a reappointment ob- 
jective, a Federal Reserve chairman who had allowed a financial crisis to oc- 
cur  “on  his  watch”  might  well  anticipate sharply  reduced  prospects  for 
reappointment. In the context of my  suggested alternative based on an insti- 
tutional-independence  objective, a financial crisis might easily precipitate an- 
other devolution of Federal Reserve responsibilities or even a wholesale re- 
structuring of the institution. Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that 
avoiding a financial crisis is merely an objective of Federal Reserve policy- 
makers in their role as agents acting for other principals. No doubt the presi- 
dent and Congress care about such matters as well. So do private participants 
in the financial markets. 
The role of the financial markets as yet a third principal in this interaction 
is one of  the potentially most interesting aspects of Alt’s  model. Unfortu- 
nately, however, it is far from obvious what “the market” would like the Fed- 81  Ducking out of  the Storm: U.S.  Monetary Policy 
eral Reserve to do. Part of  the problem is the great heterogeneity that has 
traditionally characterized the US.  financial system. Commercial banks, in- 
vestment banks, brokerage firms, securities dealers, thrift institutions, insur- 
ance companies, pension funds, and money management firms need not-and 
do not-share  identical objectives. The challenge is to draw generalizations 
that are useful in the context of a principal-agent model of monetary policy. 
Alt assumes that “the market” wants the central bank to provide a financial 
environment characterized by stable interest rates. But apart from sharing in 
the common desire to avoid a financial crisis, do market participants really 
seek interest rate stability? Especially in light of changes in the structure of 
the U.S. financial markets over the past two decades, interest rate stability is 
less likely to be a desideratum of professional market participants than may 
once have been the case. 
Earlier in the postwar period, the prevailing market structure, in which the 
yield curve was generally upward sloping and in which highly creditworthy 
corporate borrowers often relied on commercial banks for a major part of their 
credit needs, provided both banks and securities firms with ready profit op- 
portunities with relatively modest risk. Securities firms made profits, on av- 
erage over time, by borrowing at short term and positioning longer-maturity 
securities. Banks made profits by  issuing deposits (or deposit-like instru- 
ments) and lending to commercial, industrial, or other high-quality borrow- 
ers. Interest rate volatility merely added unwanted risk. 
More recently, however, the yield curve is less reliably upward sloping, and 
highly creditworthy corporations turn to the commercial paper market far 
more than to the banking system when they need to borrow.  One result of 
these changes in the market environment is that both banks and securities 
firms have had to seek out other-typically  more risky-profit  opportunities: 
for example, banks’ lending to developing countries and financing leveraged 
buy outs and securities firms’ issuing junk bonds and making bridge loans. 
Another result has been the increasing predominance of a trading mentality, in 
which interest-rate volatility represents not so much an unwelcome risk as a 
badly needed profit opportunity. Alt’s idea of representing the Federal Reserve 
as also responsive to “the markets” in a principal-agent setting is intriguing, 
but further thought is necessary to establish what objective to attribute to this 
third principal. 
A final reservation about Alt’s  analysis in this paper arises not fiom the 
specification of his model but from his approach to testing it empirically, As 
in much work in this area, Alt represents actual monetary policy outcomes by 
the growth rate of the money stock (here M2). But there has always been 
doubt about whether observed money growth in fact reflects deliberate Federal 
Reserve  policy  choices,  and  developments  in  the  1980s  have  increased 
grounds for doubt along these lines. 
Indeed, since 1980 the relationship between money growth and the growth 
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that there is little reason why the Federal Reserve should have relied on mon- 
etary targets for monetary policy. As Kenneth Kuttner and I have shown, data 
since 1970 provide no evidence that fluctuations in any of the familiar mone- 
tary aggregates contain information that is useful for predicting subsequent 
fluctuations in either nominal or real income. Further, because the mid- 1980s 
brought both the fastest money growth of the postwar period and the greatest 
disinflation, the correlation between money growth and price inflation calcu- 
lated in the way recommended by Milton Friedman (using two-year averages 
to smooth out short-run irregularities, and a two-year lag between the money 
growth and the inflation) is now negative for postwar data samples including 
this decade. 
In light of these developments, it is hardly surprising that many observers 
no longer think that the Federal Reserve places much emphasis on money- 
growth targets in planning and carrying out U.S.  monetary policy. If money 
growth no longer occupies a central role in the monetary policy process, then 
tests that rely on the growth of some monetary aggregate to measure the stance 
of monetary policy are unlikely to provide a valid test of an underlying model 
of Federal Reserve behavior. 